For years, Washington treated rare earths as a mining race—find a massive deposit, dig it up and challenge China. A quiet investment in a South African waste pile suggests that thinking is finally shifting. Rare earths are not a single commodity, and success is a chemistry problem, not just a geological one.
Of the 17 rare earth elements, almost all strategic and commercial value is concentrated in two magnet metals: neodymium and praseodymium, which underpin permanent magnets for electric vehicles, wind turbines and defence systems. Yet in typical hard-rock deposits, low-value lanthanum and cerium account for 60 to 70 percent of the ore. Producing more magnet metals inevitably multiplies these “liability” elements, crushing project economics—a geological ratio trap that has derailed Western ambitions for years. Ionic adsorption clay deposits, which are naturally richer in neodymium, praseodymium and heavy rare earths like dysprosium and terbium and require only chemical leaching, are almost entirely concentrated in China. Simply chasing tonnage has proved futile.
In a “METALS 100” interview this February, Kerem Usenmez, CEO of Volta Metals Ltd. (CSE: VLTA) (FSE: D0W) (OTC Pink: VOLMF), outlined the company’s recent progress and future direction. Volta Metals is a Canadian critical mineral exploration company focused on rare earths, gallium, lithium, cesium and tantalum. The company holds, has optioned and actively explores a portfolio of critical mineral projects in Ontario, covering rare earths, gallium, lithium, cesium and tantalum. Ontario is regarded as one of the world’s most promising and rapidly emerging hard-rock critical mineral mining jurisdictions.
That is why the Phalaborwa project in South Africa’s Limpopo Province matters. It is not a mine but a 35-million-tonne surface stockpile of phosphogypsum, a byproduct of decades of fertiliser production. Previous operators already extracted, milled and chemically processed the ore for phosphoric acid, leaving behind a waste pile enriched in recoverable rare earths—an artificial orebody that has already absorbed the most capital- and energy-intensive stages of mining.
Developer Rainbow Rare Earths adds a proprietary cerium-depletion step, removing roughly 65 percent of the low-value cerium before final production and dramatically improving the economics. The feedstock also contains negligible thorium and uranium, sidestepping another common hurdle. The company targets operating costs below $30 per kilogram of neodymium and praseodymium, a level that can compete with Chinese producers.
That arithmetic prompted the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation to commit $50 million in equity. Washington is sticking with the project despite diplomatic frictions with Pretoria, signalling a clear strategic pivot. The new yardstick is not total rare earth tonnage, but metallurgy, processing cost and the proportion of high-value magnet metals that can be delivered at commercially sustainable prices outside China’s supply chain.
Phalaborwa aims to start rare earth extraction in 2028, operate for 16 years, and rely largely on renewable energy, with output aimed primarily at U.S. defence and high-end manufacturing. The investment is not a one-off: Washington later pledged $500 million to the U.S.-Africa Strategic Investment Program, extending a model that uses private capital to strengthen critical mineral supply chains.
A single phosphogypsum project will not dismantle China’s vertically integrated rare earth industry. Gaps in separation capacity, downstream manufacturing and offtake agreements remain formidable. But the Phalaborwa bet marks a departure from the simplistic race for the biggest deposit. It turns instead on processing economics and supply-chain resilience—precisely the factors that underpinned China’s decades-long advantage. The next chapter of critical minerals competition will be decided not by who owns the most rock, but by who can most efficiently deliver the right elements, in the right proportions, at a competitive cost.
