GEM Mining Consulting points out that ambitious copper investment plans in the Andean region may fail to achieve the production growth expected by governments unless mining companies can overcome financing, infrastructure, and operational bottlenecks.
For mining companies and policymakers, the core implication of the report is that success should be measured by credible production baselines, not by the headline value of investment announcements. GEM recommends evaluating projects through documented milestones, financing commitments, and evidence of commercially recognized output. Such assessments help determine which development projects deserve further capital commitment and which still face obstacles that could delay production.
Peru’s 2026 mining investment portfolio includes 66 projects valued at approximately US$64.1 billion; Chile’s 2025-2034 investment pipeline totals US$104.5 billion. Argentina may also benefit from a financing framework by the U.S. Export-Import Bank, which plans to mobilize up to US$7 billion by 2027. GEM states bluntly in its report: “Announced copper is not delivered copper,” arguing that investment commitments and production forecasts cannot guarantee how much metal will ultimately reach customers.
This warning comes against the backdrop of the International Energy Agency’s 2026 base-case mine pipeline, which shows that under its stated policies scenario, primary copper demand will face a supply gap of approximately 25% by 2035. This estimate already accounts for secondary supply and refining losses, highlighting the importance of new mines coming online. But GEM cautions that the scale of announced investment may obscure a fundamental distinction: maintaining existing operations and creating additional output are two different things.
Chile’s situation illustrates this challenge. A large portion of its mining investment portfolio consists of brownfield projects aimed at maintaining production, replacing declining capacity, or expanding existing operations. Such investments can preserve substantial copper output without necessarily increasing a country’s total production.
Peru faces a similar accounting challenge in pursuing its plan to add approximately 1 million tonnes of annual copper production within five to six years. Using 2.6 million tonnes as an illustrative starting point, GEM estimates that if existing operations maintain their output, adding 1 million tonnes of total capacity by 2032 would raise national production to 3.6 million tonnes. However, if existing mines decline by 2% annually, total production is expected to fall to approximately 3.3 million tonnes, yielding net growth of only 700,000 tonnes; if annual decline reaches 3%, net growth would shrink to approximately 570,000 tonnes. These figures are scenario assumptions rather than official forecasts, but they demonstrate that resource depletion and operational losses can erode the benefits of new development projects.
Infrastructure economics add further complications, particularly for projects that depend on shared power, transport, and export facilities. GEM calculates that under its assumed operating conditions, a three-user shared infrastructure system could save US$40.56 million per year compared with standalone facilities. If only two users proceed, their combined standalone infrastructure costs would total US$152.22 million per year, while maintaining an unchanged shared system would cost US$187.78 million. The analysis shows that shared infrastructure is not automatically the cheapest option, especially when project timelines diverge or expected participants fail to proceed.
