On May 13–15, 2026, US President Donald Trump visited China for the first time in nearly a decade. The Beijing summit was widely seen as a potential turning point in US-China trade relations. Days later, the White House announced triumphantly that China had agreed to address US concerns over critical mineral and rare earth supply chain shortages – describing this as “one of the most important outcomes” of the talks.
However, in stark contrast to the White House’s narrative of a major win, China’s Ministry of Commerce made no mention of rare earths in its official summary of the summit released the following day. This “Rashomon-style” gap in messaging perfectly reflects the deeper reality of US-China competition over critical minerals: Beijing has no intention of giving up its most effective strategic leverage.
Controls remain tight, enforcement unchanged
Looking back at the evolution of rare earth controls, it is clear that China’s position has never truly softened. In April 2025, as a precise countermeasure to Trump’s so-called “Liberation Day” tariffs, China imposed export controls on seven medium and heavy rare earth elements and related items: samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium. In October of the same year, China’s Ministry of Commerce further issued six major announcements, imposing systematic controls on rare earth equipment, raw and auxiliary materials, medium-to-heavy rare earths, and related technologies. It also extended control reach to rare earth products manufactured overseas that contain Chinese-origin components, using rules such as “extraterritorial application”, “minimum threshold” and “direct product” provisions.
Although China agreed at the Busan summit last October to ease some rare earth export controls for one year, companies in sensitive areas with potential military applications still face extreme difficulty in obtaining export licenses. Moreover, the one-year truce expires this November – and the White House’s latest statement made no mention of whether the agreement will be extended, leaving significant uncertainty on the negotiating table.
US industry feels the real impact
The effectiveness of these controls is already visible in trade data, far beyond diplomatic rhetoric. US Department of Commerce import figures for indium show that over the past four years, the share of indium coming from China has fallen to less than 10%, forcing US importers to turn to alternative sources such as South Korea, Japan and Canada.
Emily Benson, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said: “China is leveraging its dominant position in critical mineral supply chains to precisely restrict the flow of materials to US defence and high-tech industries, without completely cutting off supply.” She noted that China’s export licensing approval rate has improved slightly this year, but approvals for sensitive uses – including aerospace and semiconductor manufacturing – remain “selectively slowed”.
According to the latest customs data, China’s global indium exports have fallen by roughly two-thirds, while exports to the United States have plunged 77%. The US semiconductor and aerospace industries have repeatedly pressured Washington to intervene with Beijing. Meanwhile, the CEO delegation that accompanied Trump on his visit included the CEO of Coherent, a company that holds a 40% global market share in indium phosphide optical components – a clear sign of how anxious the US tech industry is about rare earth supply chain disruptions.
China firmly holds strategic initiative
Faced with Washington’s high-profile claims, Beijing has always left room for manoeuvre in its position. A Ministry of Commerce spokesperson has repeatedly emphasised that rare earth items have dual-use (civilian and military) applications, and that export controls are “a legitimate practice to improve our own export control system”, aimed at “preventing rare earths from illegally flowing to weapons of mass destruction or other improper uses, and better safeguarding China’s national security”. This language aligns with international norms while avoiding any direct response to US demands.
Cory Combs, associate director at macro research firm Trivium China, offered a precise assessment: the outcomes of the consultations, while “not ideal”, were “fine”. More importantly, he said, “both sides have clearly, credibly indicated interest in stability”. In other words, the White House needs a diplomatic win to show its domestic audience, while China has no intention of making substantive concessions on its core strategic resources.
In the game over critical minerals, rhetoric can be flexible, but resources are the hardest currency. To date, China controls more than 90% of global rare earth refining capacity, roughly 70% of indium production, and has imposed comprehensive technology blockades on rare earth processing and specialised processes. The White House can spin the outcome of the talks – but Beijing’s silence is the truest statement of all.
